China, India Compete for Influence in the Indian Ocean
(TME) Home to almost two billion people, some of the world’s most dynamic economies, and important shipping routes, South Asia is a crucial geopolitical arena and the site of increasing rivalry between two of Asia’s biggest powers—China and India.
This growing competition manifests in many areas. Despite having much in common—as rising powers with nuclear weapons and large populations alongside a shared ambition of multipolarity—India and China regard each other with suspicion.
This has led the two countries to try and contain the influence of the other, and to compete to expand into new areas of regional strategic interest in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
For China, greater influence in South Asia supports domestic and foreign policy goals, specifically protecting access to world markets via the Indian Ocean region’s important global maritime routes.
Aiming to challenge India’s position as the regional naval hegemon, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has also built up presence in the Indian Ocean.
Furthermore, using the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has strengthened relations in South Asia through infrastructure investments and greater connectivity via sea, road, and rail. This also supports China’s ambition of building a ‘community of common security’ in the neighborhood.
Most of India’s South Asian neighbors—aside from Bhutan—have joined the BRI, under which Chinese investment has grown considerably through soft power and hard power. Since 2018, China has committed or invested over $150 billion in the economies of Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. China is now the largest overseas investor in Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
This has worried India, which fears that China may significantly impact its own sphere of influence and even encircle India with a ‘String of Pearls’, similar to Beijing’s fears of a ‘Malacca Dilemma’.
This growing competition manifests in many areas. Despite having much in common—as rising powers with nuclear weapons and large populations alongside a shared ambition of multipolarity—India and China regard each other with suspicion.
This has led the two countries to try and contain the influence of the other, and to compete to expand into new areas of regional strategic interest in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
For China, greater influence in South Asia supports domestic and foreign policy goals, specifically protecting access to world markets via the Indian Ocean region’s important global maritime routes.
Aiming to challenge India’s position as the regional naval hegemon, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has also built up presence in the Indian Ocean.
Furthermore, using the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has strengthened relations in South Asia through infrastructure investments and greater connectivity via sea, road, and rail. This also supports China’s ambition of building a ‘community of common security’ in the neighborhood.
Most of India’s South Asian neighbors—aside from Bhutan—have joined the BRI, under which Chinese investment has grown considerably through soft power and hard power. Since 2018, China has committed or invested over $150 billion in the economies of Bangladesh, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. China is now the largest overseas investor in Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
This has worried India, which fears that China may significantly impact its own sphere of influence and even encircle India with a ‘String of Pearls’, similar to Beijing’s fears of a ‘Malacca Dilemma’.
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